Name der Zeitschrift: Klio Jahrgang: 100 Heft: 2 Seiten: 523-527.

We used a multi-dimensional framework to assess current stereotypes of men and women. Specifically, we sought to determine (1) how men and women are characterized by male and female raters, (2) how men and women characterize themselves, and (3) the degree of convergence between self-characterizations and charcterizations of one’s gender group. In an experimental study, 628 U.S. male and female raters described men, women, or themselves on scales representing multiple dimensions of the two defining features of gender stereotypes, agency and (...) communality: assertiveness, independence, instrumental competence, leadership competence (agency dimensions), and concern for others, sociability and emotional sensitivity (communality dimensions). Results indicated that stereotypes about communality persist and were equally prevalent for male and female raters, but agency characterizations were more complex. Male raters generally descibed women as being less agentic than men and as less agentic than female raters described them. However, female raters differentiated among agency dimensions and described women as less assertive than men but as equally independent and leadership competent. Gender stereotypes also were evident in self-ratings, with female raters rating themselves as less agentic than male raters and male raters rating themselves as less communal than female raters, although there were exceptions (e.g., no differences in independence and sociability self-ratings for men and women). Comparisons of self-ratings and ratings of men and women in general indicated that women tended to characterize themselves in more stereotypic terms – as less assertive and less competent in leadership – than they characterized others in their gender group. Men, in contrast, characterized themselves in less stereotypic terms – as more communal. Overall, our results show that a focus on facets of agency and communality can provide deeper insights about stereotype content than a focus on overall agency and communality. (shrink)

The term “emotional practices” is gaining currency in the historical study of emotions. This essay discusses the theoretical and methodological implications of this concept. A definition of emotion informed by practice theory promises to bridge persistent dichotomies with which historians of emotion grapple, such as body and mind, structure and agency, as well as expression and experience. Practice theory emphasizes the importance of habituation and social context and is thus consistent with, and could enrich, psychological models of situated, distributed, and (...) embodied cognition and their approaches to the study of emotion.It is suggested here that practices not only generate emotions, but that emotions themselves can be viewed as a practical engagement with the world. Conceiving of emotions as practices means understanding them as emerging from bodily dispositions conditioned by a social context, which always has cultural and historical specificity. Emotion-as-practice is bound up with and dependent on “emotional practices,” defined here as practices involving the self , language, material artifacts, the environment, and other people. Drawing on Pierre Bourdieu's concept of habitus, the essay emphasizes that the body is not a static, timeless, universal foundation that produces ahistorical emotional arousal, but is itself socially situated, adaptive, trained, plastic, and thus historical. Four kinds of emotional practices that make use of the capacities of a body trained by specific social settings and power relations are sketched out—mobilizing, naming, communicating, and regulating emotion—as are consequences for method in historical research. (shrink)

In Being and Time as well as in his later writings, Heidegger comes to distinguish between fundamental moods and everyday or inauthentic moods. He also claims that phenomenology, rather than psychology, is the appropriate method for examining moods. This article employs a schematic approach to investigate a phenomenology of fundamental moods in terms of its possibilities and limits. Since, in Being and Time, the distinction between fundamental moods and ordinary moods is tied to the division between authenticity and inauthenticity, the (...) latter concepts need to be addressed first. Guided by Klaus Held's article 'Fundamental Moods and Heidegger's Critique of Contemporary Culture', the second part of the article argues that Heidegger's phenomenology of moods is indeed one-sided, favouring anxiety at the expense of awe. Finally, I argue that, contrary to Held's claims, this one-sidedness cannot be amended by the means one finds in Heidegger's analyses. Instead, it is necessary to undertake closer examination of those moods which necessarily involve the other person. (shrink)

Like Einstein's general theory of relativity is concerned with explaining the basics of an observable experience – i.e., gravity – most people take for granted that Chomsky's theory of generative grammar (GG) is concerned with the basic nature of language. This chapter highlights a mere subset of central constructs in GG, showing how they have featured prominently and thus shaped formal linguistic studies in multilingualism. Because multilingualism includes a wide range of nonmonolingual populations, the constructs are divided across child bilingualism (...) and adult third language for greater coverage. In the case of the former, the chapter examines how poverty of the stimulus has been investigated. Using the nascent field of L3/Ln acquisition as the backdrop, it discusses how the GG constructs of I‐language versus E‐language sit at the core of debates regarding the very notion of what linguistic transfer and mental representations should be taken to be. (shrink)

This paper explores how consumers’ ethical food consumption practices, mediated by mobile phone applications (apps), are transformed into digital data. Based on a review of studies on the digitalization of ethical consumption practices and food apps, we find that previous research, while valuable, fails to acknowledge and critically examine the digital labor required to perform digitalized ethical food consumption. In this paper, we call for research on how digital labor underlies the digitalization of ethical food consumption and develop a conceptual (...) framework that supports this research agenda. Our proposed conceptual framework builds on three interconnected analytical concepts—datafication, affordances and digital labor—that enable the study of digital labor as an infrastructural element of digitalized food consumption. We illustrate our conceptual framework through our previous research concerning Buycott, a US-based mobile app whose stated aim is to facilitate consumers’ ethical purchasing decisions. Using the walkthrough method, we consider how the Buycott app engages user-generated data and what implications this holds for consumers. The app’s infrastructure, we suggest, connects ethical consumption and digital labor. A richer understanding of the digital food economy, we propose, enables social scientists not only to elucidate how consumers engage in digital labor, but also to contribute to the development of new data governance structures in the digital food economy. We therefore call for social scientists interested in food, consumption and the digital economy to contribute to a new research agenda for studying everyday food digitalization by empirically examining how ethical consumption apps implicate ethical consumers’ work. (shrink)

In recent years, there has been a growing public discourse regarding the influence AI will have on the future of work. Simultaneously, considerable critical attention has been given to the implications of AI on gender equality. Far from making precise predictions about the future, this discourse demonstrates that new technologies are instances for renegotiating the relation of gender and work. This paper examines how gender is addressed in news media discourse on AI and the future of work, focusing on Germany. (...) We approach this question from a perspective of feminist technology studies and discourse analysis, exploring a corpus of 178 articles from 2015 to 2021 from German newspapers and newsmagazines. The findings indicate that critical AI and gender knowledge circulates in public discourse in the form of specific discursive frames, thematizing algorithmic bias, automatization and enhancement, and gender stereotypes. As a result, we show that, first, the discourse takes up feminist and scholarly discourse on gender and discusses AI in a way that is informed by social constructivism and standpoint theories. Second, gender appears as a—to some extent intersectional—diversity category which is critical to AI, while at the same time omitting important perspectives. Third, it can be shown that there is a renegotiating of the ideal worker norm taking place, and finally, we argue that the gendered frame of the powerful men developer responsible for AI’s risk is a concept to be challenged. (shrink)

Does it follow from Wittgenstein's views about indeterminism that irregularities of nature could take place? Did he believe that chairs could simply disappear and reappear, that water could behave differently than it has, and that a man throwing a fair die might throw ones for a week? Or are these things only imaginable? Is his view simply that if we adopted an indeterministic point of view we would no longer look for causes, or would not always look for causes, because (...) we would no longer assume that there must be a cause of each event? (shrink)

The paper presents a description of the foundations of Ludvik Bartelj's philosophy. Bartelj, born in 1913, lives and writes philosophy and theology in Slovenia. He is a close follower of his teacher's, France Weber/Veber, "Gegenstandsphilosophie" ["object-philosophy" = OP]. He develops OP in some respects and also in some areas missing in Veber but even these innovations take as their point of departure Veberian "Gegenstandsphilosophie." For Bartelj OP theory is the fundamental philosophic discipline and, finally, will embrace all real "objects." OP (...) itself is grounded in the knowledge that objects receive their contents from Primeval Reality [Urwirklichkeit; Prastvarnost], i.e. from God. Bartelj also exploits the scholastic tradition and he intends to complement one of the two positions by means of the other. He divides the faculty of cognition into four species: Sense perception, "profound understanding" [Tiefenverstand; globinski razum], "peripheral understanding," and feelings. Profound and peripheral understanding are intertwined indissolubly: Whereas profound understanding approaches objects in a non-conceptual way, peripheral understanding has the task to determine conceptually profound understanding's cognition. By means of profound understanding the subject of cognition as well as its experiences are epistemically grasped. God, too, is the object of profound understanding, and knowledge of God directly emerges from the real empirical world. Profound understanding discovers that such "realities" are, according to their very nature, dependent on something else, i.e. their content come from a being independent by nature, which Bartelj calls "Primeval Reality" [Prastvarnost] or "God". (shrink)

In the following discussion, we are dealing with Weber's theory of the production of presentations, as presented in his article "The Problem of the Production of Presentations". In this article, published in 1928, Weber offers an essential modification of a version of the theory of objects which had been developed by the Graz school (and was closely linked with the theory of higher-order objects). According to Weber, the production of presentations consists in a primary transition from passive to corresponding active (...) presentations (so there is active as well as passive presentation). Weber distinguishes several types of production of presentations: psychophysical, content, act, intentional, and surrogate production, all of which can be divided into many subtypes. Most interesting in this connection is his theory of intentional presentation. In the 1928 article, Weber postulates non-intentional presentations, on which intentional presentations are based. He distinguishes four levels of intentionality: non-intentional presentation, on the lowest level, is followed by presentational intentionality, isolative, and rational intentional presentation. Weber's 1928 article is of considerable importance for an understanding of his subsequent philosophical development. (shrink)

Does it follow from Wittgenstein's views about indeterminism that irregularities of nature could take place? Did he believe that chairs could simply disappear and reappear, that water could behave differently than it has, and that a man throwing a fair die might throw ones for a week? Or are these things only imaginable? Is his view simply that if we adopted an indeterministic point of view we would no longer look for causes, or would not always look for causes, because (...) we would no longer assume that there must be a cause of each event? (shrink)

Reflective equilibrium —the idea that we have to justify our judgments and principles through a process of mutual adjustment—is taken to be a central method in philosophy. Nonetheless, conceptions of RE often stay sketchy, and there is a striking lack of explicit and traceable applications of it. This paper presents an explicit case study for the application of an elaborate RE conception. RE is used to reconstruct the arguments from Thomson’s paper “Turning the Trolley” for why a bystander must not (...) divert a runaway trolley from five workmen onto one. Analyzing Thomson’s resulting position with the RE-criteria has two main results: Firstly, the adjustment of one of her commitments can be defended. Secondly, no justified position in RE was reached. With respect to RE as a method, the main results from this application are: There is at least one conception of RE that is sufficiently specified to be applicable; the RE criteria put real constraints on the process of justification; and an explicit application of RE has benefits in terms of clarity while at the same time providing guidance for how the justificatory process could be continued. (shrink)

This essay interprets the work of the German choreographer Pina Bausch with the help of phenomenological examinations by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Emmanuel Levinas, and Martin Heidegger. Pina Bauschs choreography not only shares basic themes like the everyday, the body, and moods with phenomenology, but they also yield similar results in overcoming traditional dualist frameworks. Rather than being an instrument for expressing ideas, the body is in constant exchange with the natural elements, exhibiting vulnerability and passivity. Moods, in turn, are neither subjective (...) nor objective; this also holds for longing, an essential constituent of Pina Bausch's work. Dance theater and phenomenology, each in their unique ways, are capable of acknowledging and accommodating the ambiguity of our human existence. (shrink)

The paper presents a description of the foundations of Ludvik Barteljs philosophy. Bartelj, born in 1913, lives and writes philosophy and theology in Slovenia. He is a close follower of his teachers, France Weber/Veber, Gegenstandsphilosophie [object-philosophy= OP]. He develops OP in some respects and also in some areas missing in Veber but even these innovations take as their point of departure Veberian Gegenstandsphilosophie. For Bartelj OP theory is the fundamental philosophic discipline and, finally, will embrace all real objects. OP itself (...) is grounded in the knowledge that objects receive their contents from Primeval Reality [Urwirklichkeit; Prastvarnost], i.e. from God. Bartelj also exploits the scholastic tradition and he intends to complement one of the two positions by means of the other. He divides the faculty of cognition into four species: Sense perception, profound understanding [Tiefenverstand; globinski razum], peripheral understanding, and feelings. Profound and peripheral understanding are intertwined indissolubly: Whereas profound understanding approaches objects in a non-conceptual way, peripheral understanding has the task to determine conceptually profound understandings cognition(s). By means of profound understanding the subject of cognition as well as its experiences are epistemically grasped. God, too, is the object of profound understanding, and knowledge of God directly emerges from the real empirical world. Profound understanding discovers that such realities are, according to their very nature, dependent on something else, i.e. their content(s) come(s) from a being independent by nature, which Bartelj calls Primeval Reality [Prastvarnost] or God. (shrink)

Levinas’s comments on art appear contradictory. On the one hand, he criticizes art as being disengaged from ethical concerns and constituting a possibility of moral evasion; on the other hand, he engages quite closely and in a supportive fashion with some art, such as Paul Celan’s poetry. Interpreters commonly argue that only one of Levinas’s conceptions of art, either the affirmative or the negative, represents his true attitude towards art. In this article the author seeks to make both statements compatible (...) with each other and thus relevant to Levinas’s conception of art. She focuses on his essay ‘Reality and Its Shadow’, where art is diagnosed as an ambiguous phenomenon. She argues that full understanding of the ambiguity of art demands that Levinas’s different statements about art are considered together; only thus can the complete picture of the ambiguity emerge. Furthermore, it turns out that the very same feature which makes art open to misunderstanding – namely, its precarious materiality – also allows an artwork to sustain itself and to be revived. Art reveals a shadow, withdrawal, or resistance that belongs to reality itself. (shrink)

This essay examines Heidegger’s phenomenology of conscience in Being and Time. From a phenomenological perspective, the call of conscience needs to be analysed with respect to who is calling, who is being called, what message is conveyed, and how the message is conveyed. Heidegger’s results are rather surprising to our common understanding and impose various challenges on his interpreters. In my article, I return to Heidegger’s text in order to question some persuasions and assumptions of the common readings. The call (...) comes from me, yet in such a way that it overcomes me. The call does not come from a different being in the world, and the call of conscience should thus not be conflated with the ‘voice of the friend’ mentioned in an earlier section of Being and Time. Rather, we need to take the call seriously as alien and yet my own, giving me to understand that I am guilty before and outside of any economy of deeds. Because the call of conscience belongs to such a fundamental level, Heidegger’s response concerning the ‘how’ of the call also becomes understandable. The call is unambiguous, even though we always give ambiguous interpretations of it. (shrink)

How do we begin to philosophize? What are the main features of natural, prephilosophical consciousness, and what is its relation to philosophical consciousness? This study investigates the answers given to these questions in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit and in Husserl's phenomenology.

1. IntroductionUn collègue niçois, Marcel Vuillaume, m'a dit souvent que la phonologie, en comparaison avec la sémantique à laquelle il s'intéresse, a cet avantage d'être ancrée dans le réel : elle peut s'appuyer sur la phonétique et donc décrire les catégories qui sont pertinentes pour elle de manière objective. La pauvre sémantique, elle, doit se servir, pour la description de ses observables, de son propre objet d'étude. En conséquence, la circularité la guette en permanence. Les phonologu..

Every second-countable regular topological space X is metrizable. For a given “computable” topological space satisfying an axiom of computable regularity M. Schröder [10] has constructed a computable metric. In this article we study whether this metric space can be considered computationally as a subspace of some computable metric space [15]. While Schröder's construction is “pointless”, i. e., only sets of a countable base but no concrete points are known, for a computable metric space a concrete dense set of computable points (...) is needed. But there may be no computable points in X. By converging sequences of basis sets instead of Cauchy sequences of points we construct a metric completion of a space together with a canonical representation equation image, equation image. We show that there is a computable embedding of in with computable inverse. Finally, we construct a notation of a dense set of points in with computable mutual distances and prove that the Cauchy representation of the resulting computable metric space is equivalent to equation image. Therefore, every computably regular space has a computable homeomorphic embedding in a computable metric space, which topologically is its completion. By the way we prove a computable Urysohn lemma. (shrink)

This theory regards intentions as mental states, e.g., attitudes, which, typically, have causal power. But we do not speak of our intentions as having such powers. Instead, we speak of a person's resolve, determination, or his anxiety, eagerness, and so forth, as the ‘powers’ that move us. Of course, one desires for various reasons to carry out his various intentions but that desire is not a component of the intentions. An intention is, roughly, the course of action that one has (...) adopted, so it has no such components. There are other characteristics of intentions which the mental state idea of intentions does not share. Intentions do not have the temporal characteristics that mental states have, or share the curious context dependency that intentions have. And since, according to the theory, mental states operate causally, it would not be possible for a person to commit himself to a course of action as we ordinarily do when we make a promise or sign an agreement or contract. (shrink)

Interpreters generally agree that the Fifth Cartesian Meditation fails to achieve its task, but they do not agree on what that task is. In my essay, I attempt to formulate the question to which the Fifth Cartesian Meditation gives the answer. While it is usually assumed that the text poses a rather ambitious question, I suggest that the text asks, How is the Other given to me on the most basic level? The answer would be that the Other is given (...) as accessible in the mode of inaccessibility. Husserl’s failure to convey this question clearly seems rooted in ambiguities concerning the concepts of solipsism and the sphere of ownness. (shrink)

Husserl?s concept of imagination has been systematically presented in Husserliana XXIII, in which its manifold role has been set out. Through the different texts, the author shows that phantasy should be considered as one of the modifications of pure re-presentation. The article first tries to underline the distinction between Husserl?s deliberation on this phenomenon and the traditional concept of imagination. Second, it shows the fundamental moments of constitu?tional consciousness in order to relate the notion of imagination to perceptual apprehension. At (...) the very end, the notion of phantasy is connected with the idea of first philosophy and the question of possibil?ity of its realization. (shrink)

This paper integrates the inclusion and organizational ethics literatures to examine the relationship between employees’ perceptions of an organizational integration and learning approach to diversity and two employee outcomes: organizational citizenship behavior toward the organization and interpersonal workplace deviance. Findings across two field studies from the USA and Germany show that employees’ perceptions of an organizational integration and learning approach to diversity are positively related to perceived organizational ethical virtue. Perceived organizational ethical virtue further transmits the effect of employees’ perceptions (...) of an organizational integration and learning approach to diversity on both organizational citizenship behavior toward the organization and interpersonal workplace deviance. In addition, we find support for a moderated indirect effect model whereby the indirect effect of the perceived integration and learning approach to diversity on the dependent variables through perceived organizational ethical virtue is stronger when employees have high personal value for diversity rather than low personal value for diversity. These results underscore the importance of having a fit between employees’ perceptions of an organization’s approach to diversity and employees’ personal value for diversity in order for inclusion to result in positive employee behaviors. Results emphasize the ethical responsibility of organizations in terms of how they approach diversity. (shrink)

In "Unambiguous Calling? Authenticity and Ethics in Heidegger's Being and Time", Tanja Staeler revisits the concept of authenticity in order to investigate several assumptions often taken for granted in secondary literature. She argues that the distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity should be read as a methodological and, more precisely, phenomenological distinction. Showing that authenticity cannot really be understood as a state one can be in, she argues that talk of a 'transition' to authenticity is, at best, unhelpful. Her argument, (...) consequently, moves to the notion of the 'call of conscience' in order to investigate the ethical implications of the notion of authenticity. She justifies the unambiguous character of the 'call of conscience' with the help of Lévinas' thought. (shrink)

Recent research on grapheme-colour synesthesia has focused on whether visual attention is necessary to induce a synesthetic percept. The current study investigated the influence of synesthesia on overt visual attention during an oculomotor target selection task. Chromatic and achromatic stimuli were presented with one target among distractors among multiple ‘5’s ). Participants executed an eye movement to the target. Synesthetes and controls showed a comparable target selection performance across conditions and a ‘pop-out effect’ was only seen in the chromatic condition. (...) As a pop-out effect was absent for the synesthetes in the achromatic condition, a synesthetic element appears not to elicit a synesthetic colour, even when it is the target. The synesthetic percepts are not pre-attentively available to distinguish the synesthetic target from synesthetic distractors when elements are presented in the periphery. Synesthesia appears to require full recognition to bind form and colour. (shrink)

This book offers the first study that relates the works of Hegel and Husserl. It also offers a timely philosophical description of the Western world in crisis. The author explores how Husserl radicalises Hegel's philosophy by providing an account of historical movement as open.

Background:Adolescents’ health choices have been widely researched, but the ethical basis of these choices, namely their rights, duties, and responsibilities, have been disregarded and scale is required to measure these.Objective:To describe the development of a scale that measures adolescents’ rights, duties, and responsibilities in relation to health choices and document the preliminary scale testing.Research design:A multi-phase development method was used to construct the Health Rights Duties and Responsibilities ( HealthRDR) scale. The concepts and content were defined through document analysis, a (...) systematic literature review, and focus groups. The content validity and clarity of the items were evaluated by expert panel of 23 adolescents, school nurses, and researchers. We calculated the content validity index and the content validity ratio at on item and scale levels. Preliminary testing was conducted with 200 adolescents aged 15–16 years. Descriptive statistics, Cronbach’s alpha correlation, and statistics for the item-analysis were calculated.Ethical considerations:Ethical approval and permission were obtained according to national legislation and responsible research practice was followed. Informed consent was obtained from the participants and the parents were informed about the study.Findings:The Health Rights Duties and Responsibilities scale comprises of four sub-scales with 148 items: 15 on health choices, 36 on rights, 47 on duties, and 50 on responsibilities. The items had a 0.93 content validity index and a 0.85 content validity ratio. Cronbach’s alpha correlation coefficient was 0.99 for the total scale and the individual sub-scales scores were health choices (0.93), rights (0.97), responsibilities (0.99), and duties (0.98).Discussion:The findings are discussed in light of the ethical concepts and validity and reliability of the developed scale.Conclusion:The Health Rights Duties and Responsibilities scale defines and understands adolescents’ rights, duties, and responsibilities in relation to health choices and has good content validity. Further testing and refinement of the concepts are needed. (shrink)

Abstract (German version follows): -/- This paper develops a new proposal for a coherentist business ethic in which ethically justified and empirically supported proposed solutions to economic problems are developed through a coherentist process of adjustments between the three levels of (1) conception of problem and its solution, (2) positive economic theory, and (3) ethical theories. Using an example, it illustrates how in this framework, Homann's business ethics gains in validity and relevance but loses its claim to universality. // -/- (...) Diese Arbeit entwickelt eine kohärentistische Wirtschaftsethik, in der ethisch begründete und empirisch gestützte Lösungsvorschläge für ökonomische Probleme durch einen kohärentistischen Anpassungsprozess zwischen den drei Ebenen (1) Auffassung von Problem und Lösungsansatz, (2) positive ökonomische Theorie, sowie (3) ethischen Theorien erarbeitet werden. Anhand eines Beispiels wird illustriert, wie Homanns Wirtschaftsethik in diesem Rahmen an Validität und Relevanz gewinnt, jedoch ihren Universalitätsanspruch verliert. (shrink)

In his essay 'The Pit and the Pyramid: Introduction to Hegel's Semiology', Jacques Derrida claims that there is a privilege of speech over writing inherent in Hegel's theory of signs. In this paper, I examine Derrida's criticism. While it is to Derrida's credit that he focusses on an area of Hegel's philosophy that has hardly been analysed, his reading is problematic in several regards. After presenting Derrida's main arguments, I pose three questions, the first of which belongs to the realm (...) of subjective spirit, the second to objective spirit, and the third to absolute spirit. I shall then show that Hegel makes several statements in favour of a privilege of writing over speech - statements that are not merely parenthetic or marginal. Moreover, those claims that Hegel makes toward any privilege of speech are in the wrong place, namely, subjective spirit, for them to represent his final point of view. (shrink)

“Partout et nulle part”. L’ambiguïté explorée à partir de la phénoménologie et de la danseOn ménage ici, à l’aide du concept d’ambiguïté, une rencontre entre le théâtre dansé de Pina Bausch et la phénoménologie de Merleau-Ponty. Le concept d’ambiguïté est au centre de la philosophie de Merleau-Ponty, qu’on a d’ailleurs pu considérer comme une « philosophie de l’ambiguïté ». Néanmoins, le concept phénoménologique d’ambiguïté n’a pas encore été discuté dans la littérature secondaire. Cette étude distingue plusieurs sens de l’ambiguïté dans (...) la Phénoménologie de la perception, avant de se tourner vers la différence entre bonne et mauvaise ambiguïté, telle que Merleau-Ponty a pu la proposer.Il apparaîtra que la chorégraphie de Pina Bausch et la philosophie de Merleau-Ponty sont deux voies d’approche complémentaires des différentes dimensions de l’ambiguïté :les dimensions corporelle, spatiale et culturelle. L’étude montre que l’approche merleau-pontienne de l’ambiguïté et l’approche par Pina Bausch du théâtre dansé parviennent toutes deux à instaurer un type de communication humaine ne s’évanouissant ni dans un relativisme vide ni dans un universalisme formel : « Ce qu’il faut comprendre, c’est que je suis présent ici et maintenant et, pour la même raison, présent ailleurs et toujours, et aussi que je m’absente d’ici et de maintenant, ainsi que de tout lieu et de tout temps. L’ambiguïté n’est pas une imperfection de la conscience ou de l’existence, c’est leur définition même » (PhP).“Ovunque e in nessun luogo”. Esplorare l’ambiguità con la fenomenologia e la danzaProponiamo qui, sul filo del concetto di ambiguità, un incontro tra il teatro danza di Pina Bausch e la fenomenologia di Merleau-Ponty. Il concetto fenomenologico di ambiguità, pur non essendo stato veramente discusso nella letteratura critica, risulta centrale nella filosofia di Merleau-Ponty, che è stata appunto definita filosofia dell’ambiguità.Questo saggio individua i diversi significati di ambiguità contenuti in Fenomenologia della percezione, prima di rivolgersi alla differenza tra buona e cattiva ambiguità, così come viene proposta da Merleau-Ponty.Si scoprirà come il lavoro coreografi co di Pina Bausch e la filosofia merleaupontiana siano due modi complementari di approcciare le diverse dimensioni dell’ambiguità: ambiguità corporea, ambiguità spaziale, ambiguità culturale. Il saggio sostiene infatti la tesi che l’approccio merleaupontiano all’ambiguità e l’approccio di Pina Bausch al teatro-danza trovino entrambi delle modalità per stabilire un tipo di comunicazione umana che riesca a non collassare né in un vuoto relativismo né in un universalismo formalistico: “Dobbiamo comprendere che la medesima ragione mi rende presente qui ed ora e presente altrove e sempre, assente da qui e da ora e assente da ogni luogo e da ogni tempo. Questa ambiguità non è un’imperfezione della coscienza o dell’esistenza, ma ne è una definizione” (Fenomenologia della percezione). (shrink)

In the second half of the twentieth century, ethics has gained considerable prominence within philosophy. In contrast to other scholars, Levinas proposed that it be not one philosophical discipline among many, but the most fundamental and essential one. Before philosophy became divided into disciplines, Plato also treated the question of the Good as the most important philosophical question. Levinas's approach to ethics begins in the encounter with the other as the most basic experience of responsibility. He acknowledges the necessity to (...) move beyond this initial, dyadic encounter, but has problems extending his approach to a larger dimension, such as community. To shed light on this dilemma, Tanja Staehler examines broader dimensions which are linked to the political realm, and the problems they pose for ethics. Staehler demonstrates that both Plato and Levinas come to identify three realms as ambiguous: the erotic, the artistic, and the political. In each case, there is a precarious position in relation to ethics. However, neither Plato nor Levinas explores ambiguity in itself. Staehler argues that these ambiguous dimensions can contribute to revealing the Other’s vulnerability without diminishing the fundamental role of unambiguous ethical responsibility. (shrink)

In the second half of the twentieth century, ethics has gained considerable prominence within philosophy. In contrast to other scholars, Levinas proposed that it be not one philosophical discipline among many, but the most fundamental and essential one. Before philosophy became divided into disciplines, Plato also treated the question of the Good as the most important philosophical question. Levinas's approach to ethics begins in the encounter with the other as the most basic experience of responsibility. He acknowledges the necessity to (...) move beyond this initial, dyadic encounter, but has problems extending his approach to a larger dimension, such as community. To shed light on this dilemma, Tanja Staehler examines broader dimensions which are linked to the political realm, and the problems they pose for ethics. Staehler demonstrates that both Plato and Levinas come to identify three realms as ambiguous: the erotic, the artistic, and the political. In each case, there is a precarious position in relation to ethics. However, neither Plato nor Levinas explores ambiguity in itself. Staehler argues that these ambiguous dimensions can contribute to revealing the Other’s vulnerability without diminishing the fundamental role of unambiguous ethical responsibility. (shrink)

In this paper, we focus on one controversial element of the method of reflective equilibrium, namely Rawls’s idea that the commitments that enter the justificatory procedure should be pre-selected or filtered: According to him, only considered judgements should be taken into account in moral philosophy. There are two camps of critics of this filtering process: 1) Critics of reflective equilibrium: They reject the Rawlsian filtering process as too weak and seek a more reliable one, which would actually constitute a distinct (...) epistemic method. 2) Proponents of reflective equilibrium: They reject the Rawlsian filtering process as too exclusionary. We defend RE against its critics, arguing that the method can secure reasonable commitments without depending on a strong external filtering process. However, we side with the critical proponents of reflective equilibrium and argue that without the Rawlsian weak filtering process, RE is more plausible both as a general method as well as in the context of moral philosophy. (shrink)

Using diversity climate theory and research, this paper examines the relationships among an organization’s actions which indicate a value for age diversity and potential applicants’ reactions toward that organization. Specifically, we investigate the interactive effects of an organization’s age diversity, an organization’s age diversity management practices, and potential applicants’ individual attitudes toward age diversity on two outcome variables, organizational attractiveness and expected age discrimination. We conducted an experimental survey study with a sample of 244 German employees likely to be in (...) the job market again in their careers. Organizational age diversity and age diversity management practices were positively related to organizational attractiveness and negatively related to expected age discrimination. Results also support a three-way interaction of an organization’s age diversity, an organization’s age diversity management practices, and potential applicants’ attitudes toward age diversity on both dependent variables. The findings demonstrate the importance of considering individual attitudes toward age diversity in assessing the effectiveness of an organization’s age diversity and age diversity management practices. (shrink)

William Child has said that Wittgenstein is an anti-realist with respect to a person's dreams, recent thoughts that he has consciously entertained and other things. I discuss Wittgenstein's comments about these matters in order to show that they do not commit him to an anti-realist view or a realist view. He wished to discredit the idea that when a person reports his dream or his thoughts, or past intentions, the person is reading off the contents of his mind or memory. (...) Reporting what one dreamt or recently thought is not like reporting what one has just read. The language is different, and the criterion of truth is different. The anti-realist is able to explain why the reports of thoughts, for instance, are "guaranteed" to be true (PI II, 222) by stipulating that the character and existence of the past thought is constituted by an inclination to assert that one had that past thought so the assertion could not be false. This could not be Wittgenstein's view. What does "guarantee" the truth of such an assertion is the fact that the person himself is the principle authority on what he dreamt, thought, and intended, something which "stands fast" for us. I next consider Crispin Wright's account of Wittgenstein's ideas about intentions and point out that his assumption that person always makes a judgement as to whether his action conforms to his intention is clearly false. And he is wrong in attributing to Wittgenstein the idea that an intention does not have a determinate content prior to its author's judgement about whether the action conforms to the intention, an idea that is obscure. If this were accurate, it would be a mystery why we do anything, or, at least, why our actions ever conform to our intentions. (shrink)

The article discusses the necessity for the diversification of stories of Yugoslavia, arguing for the importance of incorporating the affects and experiences of Yugoslavia?s citizens into the historical narratives. Acknowledging the difficulties emerging form the fact that what is articulated as historical narrative is still part of the experience for millions of citizens of post-Yugoslav societies, the article reflects upon the potential for and obstacles to an affective history of socialist Yugoslavia through the lens borrowed from German sociologist Georg Simmel. (...) It particularly refers to - and makes use of - two sets of Simmel?s ideas. The first concerns the nature of material and the way we are making a story out of it - more precisely, the relationship between history and experience, life and representation. The second is about the perspective from which we look at, approach, and synthesize this material. Simmel?s reflections on history and form offer a very useful tool to look at the Yugoslav case and also help de-essentialize and normalize Yugoslav history, making the anxieties that characterize it part of a much broader discussion about history, its nature, and its internal contradictions. nema. (shrink)

The question of selfhood is a very old question; however, only in contemporary philosophy on the foundations of the philosophy of life, philosophy of existence and phenomenology, it is possible to find an adequate method that could enable us to approach the understanding of selfhood. To accomplish this task, the advantages and disadvantages of Husserl's phenomenology must be demonstrated. Here, the research of the structures of subjectivity and inter-subjectivity performs an important role in the interpretation of selfhood. Nevertheless, it has (...) been shown that it is necessary to reverse Husserl’s method from pure subjectivity to fragmented subjectivity in which the anticipatory role of consciousness is being re-discovered. This is important for the interpretation of selfhood not just in a theoretical way, but also in showing that selfhood could be understood only in relation to others. Actions of the self can never be understood from the position of pure subjectivity because the question of motives is a question of personality that is always a concrete historical subject. The crucial point in understanding the selfhood is showing the way in which it understands itself in the chain of intersubjective relations. From this point, it is possible to distinguish “ideal” from sinful man, the difference which has been emphasized in Nietzsche's philosophy. The only method by which we can approach the question of selfhood is the hermeneutical method. It can’t be understood by description or in the attempts to deduce it on formalism and norms. Our relationship towards others and towards ourselves should be again and again re-constructed, not only because the experience itself dictates new patterns of life, but also because only the selfhood has the ability to change the way in which the situation is interpreted and thereby it can authentically determine itself in the world. (shrink)

This essay investigates the differences and points of contact between Walter Benjamin's concept of ‘constellation’ and the notion of ‘assemblage’ as theorised by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. Both concepts address the entanglement of discourse and matter, bodies and devices, and raise questions regarding the historicity and temporality of different kinds of multiplicity. Presently, the term ‘assemblage’ figures prominently in the context of the new materialism, a theoretical movement which calls for a renewal of materialist ideas, proposing a break with (...) the historical materialism of the past. Against this backdrop, the essay has a twofold purpose: first, by focusing on the notions of constellation and assemblage, it seeks to highlight the differences and analogies between the materialisms of Benjamin, on the one hand, and Deleuze and Guattari, on the other. Second, by examining the new materialism's appropriation of Deleuzian ‘assemblage theory’, it will not only analyse what is ‘new’ about the new materialism, but also underline its conceptual errors and political problems. Eventually, what the essay argues is that our contemporary understanding of assemblages might indeed benefit from a more thorough engagement with the historical materialism of an author like Benjamin. (shrink)

1. IntroductionUn collègue niçois, Marcel Vuillaume, m'a dit souvent que la phonologie, en comparaison avec la sémantique à laquelle il s'intéresse, a cet avantage d'être ancrée dans le réel : elle peut s'appuyer sur la phonétique et donc décrire les catégories qui sont pertinentes pour elle de manière objective. La pauvre sémantique, elle, doit se servir, pour la description de ses observables, de son propre objet d'étude. En conséquence, la circularité la guette en permanence. Les phonologu...